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IN THE SUPREME COU.RT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
JAY 0. BAR.NHAR1 and VIDA
N. BAR.NIIART,
1

PlaiJZtiffs and Respondents,
Case
No.

vs.

10133
CIVIL SER.VICE E·1IPLOYEES
INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant and Appellant.
APPELLANT'S BRIE·F

STAT'EMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action by plaintiff Vida Barnhart to recover damages under the Uninsured 1Iotorist coverage
of her own insurance policy, issued by the defendant,
for personal injuries sustained by her in an accident with
an uninsured motorist.
DISPOSITION IN ·LOWER COURT
The trial judge, sitting without jury, rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant
in the amount of $6,182.50.
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2
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant and appellant seeks reversal of the judgment below.
T'HE FACTS
The record on appeal consists essentially of three
documents. Thy first of these is a folder containing
papers and pleadings filed by the respective parties,
minute entries of the court, and similar documents. In
referring to papers contained in that folder, we shall
designat~ them by the Initial "R." Secondly there is a
transcri~t of the proceedings at trial with pages numbered separately. References to this transcript are pre- .
faced by the letters " Tr." Thirdly, there is an envelope
containing exhibits received in evidence, and we refer
to the exhibits by their exhibit numbers. ·The parties are
designated as they appeared in the court below. Unless
otherwise indicated by the context, the word plaintiff
refers to plaintiff Vida Barnhart. The facts are substantially without dispute.
1

O:ri. this appeal two separate and wholly unrelated
theories are relied upon by appellants. For the convenience of the court, we have divided the facts into separate
categories pertaining to the legal questions involved:
(a) the facts of the accident; and (b) the facts relating
to the insurance coverage.
A. The Facts of the Accident.
On September 1, 1962., the plaintiff was involved in
an automobile collision with an automobile operated by
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3.
one Kenneth Danid Welcker. (Tr. 7). The collision
occurred under the following circumstances :
The t'ollision occurred on a curve in U.S. Highway
91 near An1erican Fork, and at approximately the junction of old highway 91 with new highway 91. (Ex. 2; Tr.
8, 24). At the place where the accident occurred there
were two sets of double yellow lines. (Tr. 18-19, 31).
There was a break in the double yellow lines at the point
of the intersection of old and new highway 91, permitting
south bound traffic on highway 91 to make left hand
turns from new highway 91 onto old highway 91. ('Tr.
18-19, 31).
Plaintiff was proceeding southerly along highway
91 intending to make a left hand turn onto old highway
91. ('Tr. 48). When she reached the point of the opening in the two sets of double yellow lines she did not
come to a complete stop, but moved slowly past the
opening to a point approximately 82 feet south of the
break in the double yellow lines. She was waiting for
a break in north bound traffic to permit her to complete
her left hand turn. (Tr. 31, 48-49).
W elcker was also proceeding southerly along highway 91 and when he approached the break in the yellow
lines, a north bound truck had started through the break
intending to make a left hand turn across the south
bound lanes. (Tr. 11-12). Welcker turned out to avoid
a collision with this truck, which partially obstructed
the inside lane for south bound traffic, in which he was
traveling. As he turned around the truck, he observed,
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for the first time, the plaintiff's automobile. (Tr. 12~13).
He applied brakes but was unable to stop in time to
avoid a collision. (Tr. 8). The accident occurred 82
feet south of the opening in the double yellow lines. (Tr.
31).
B. The facts as to Insurance Coverage.
On April 10, 1962, defendant Civil Service Employees Insurance Company issued to plaintiff's husband a
certain insurance policy designated as an automobile
policy, Serial No. 0014-04-8. The coverage afforded by
this policy was public liability insurance and uninsured
motorist insurance. By express provision of the policy,
the wife of the named insured (plaintiff), during the
time she occupied the insured automobile, was entitled
to the benefits of the Uninsured l\fotorist coverage.
(Ex. 1) This policy was in full force and effect at the
time of the above mentioned accident. (Ex. 1.) W elcker
testified that he had no liability insurance. (Tr. 8).
Plaintiff and her husband commenced this action
against the defendant under the Uninsured Motorist
coverage, claiming damages for personal injuries on
behalf of plaintiff, and property damage and loss of
consortium on behalf of her husband. (R. 3). However,
the husband's cause of action was dismissed at the trial
as not being within the scope of the Uninsured Motorist
coverage. ( Tr. 4.)
D'efendant's policy is a standard form automobile
policy. It is so designed as to permit the writing of
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several diffen'nt types of autonwbile coverage in one
document, whether tlw insured desires several coverages;
or only lilnited coverage. In this instance, the insured
purchased only public liability insurance, which (in this
policy) automatically included Uninsured l\Iotorist coverage. The policy provisions concerning Uninsured Motorist Coverage are contained in Part IV of the policy.
The following provisions are of material importance in
this case:
"PART IV -

FAMILY PROTECTION

AGAINS'T UNINSURED MOTORISTS
"1. Damages for Bodily Injury Caused by
Uninsured Automobiles: To pay all sums which
the insured or his legal representatives shall be
legally entitled to recover as damages from the
owner or operator of an uninsured automobile because of bodily injury, siclmess or disease, including death resulting therefrom, hereinafter
called 'bodily injury,' sustained by the insured,
caused by accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such uninsured automobile; provided for the purposes of this endorsement, determination as to whether the insured or
such representative is legally entitled to recover
such da.mages, and if so the amount thereof, shall
be made by agreement between the insured for
such representative and the con1pany, or if they
fail to agree, by arbitration.
"6. Arbitration: If any person making claim
hereunder and the company do not agree that
such person is legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured
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automobile because of bodily injury to the insured or do not agree as to the amount of payment 'which may be owing under this coverage,
then, upon written demand of either, the matter
or matters upon which such person and the company do not agree shall be settled by arbitration
in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association, and judgment upon the award
rendered by the Arbitrators may be entered in
any court having jurisdiction thereof. Such person and the company each agree to consider itself
bound and to be bound by any award made by
the- arbitrators pursuant to this endorsement.
* * * * * *
"9. Action Against Company: No action shall

lie against the company unless, as a condition
precedent thereto, the insured or his legal representative has fully complied with all the terms of
this endorsement nor unless within one year from
the date of the accident:
* * * * * *
" (c) the insured or his legal representative
has formally instituted arbitration proceedings."
(Emphasis ours.) (Ex. 1.)

It was stipulated that the defendant had filed a
demand for arbitration before the time of trial, and that
plaintiffs refused to submit to arhitration claiming that
they were not required to do so under Utah law. (Tr. 63).
Following a trial on the merits, the court ordered
judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in the amount of $6,182;.50. (R. 40, 49). A motion
to set aside the judgment and to enter judgment for the
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7
defPndant, or in the altrnative for a new trial, was denied
by the eonrt. (R. 46, 48, 53). This appeal followed. (R.
50).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE JUDGMENT IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE
AND AGAINST LAW.
POINT II
DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO HAVE THE ISSUE
OF ITS LIABILITY TO PLAINTIFFS, AND THE AMOUNT
OF PLAINTIFF'S LOSS DETERMINED BY ARBITRATION
PROCEEDINGS.

This case squarely raises for decison by this court,
the issue of the enforceability of the arbitration provisions of the Uninsured Motorist coverage. This is an
issue of considerable importance to the insurance industry, not only in Utah, but elsewhere in the nation. It is
an issue which has been treated only by a few appellate
courts in the country, none of which have the same
general arbitration law as Utah. However, there are
n1any other states which do have similar statutes, and
the decision of this court in this case will no doubt
become a landmark in this field of the law.
The Uninsured Motorist coverage is a relatively new
type of coverage, devised by the insurance industry in
an attempt to furnish some protection, at nominal cost,
to the innocent victim of an accident caused by the negligence of an uninsured motorist, or a hit-run driver.
This coverage must still be considered as being in the
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experimental stage. Some authoritative disucssion on
its background may be helpful to the court. See Plummer's article in the Insurance Law Journal, A ngust,
1957, 494:
"The history of the 'innocent victim' or the
'uninsured motorist' coverages is short but popular. It really began in January, 1954, when a few
insurance companies added the 'unsatisfied judgment' endorsement to their standard form automobile liability policies at a premium range from
$5 to $7.50. Most of the endorsements covered
bodily injury - no property damage - and would
pay after the claim was reduced to judgment. * * *

* * * * * *
"It was in December, 1956, that the National
Bureau of Casualty Underwriters and the Mutual
Insurance Rating Bureau drafted and promulgated an endorsement that could only be attached
to the family automobile policy. It provided coverage only for bodily injuries with maximum limits being the same as the financial responsibility
law requirements (with a premium range from
$3 to $12). The National Bureau named it the
'Family Protection-Auton1obile Coverage' and the
Mutual Bureau gave it the title of 'Fa1nily Protection against Uninsured Motorists.' * * *"
See also the paper on this subject delivered at the
1960 Annual Meeting of the Section of Insurance, Negligence, and Compensation Law of the American Bar
Association, reported in the official report of those proceedings at pages 281 and 282 :
"Th~ history an~ evolution of the Coverage
began w1th the pubhc concern for the innocent
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vieti m who 1nust shoulder the burden of his injuries caused by the negligent wrongdoer and the
financially irresponsible uninsured 1notorist. In
the years between 1925 and 1954 the various state
legislatures atte1npted to reduce the ntunber of
uncompensated victilns by enacting motorist responsibility laws. They sought to distribute this
responsibility throughout the motoring public by
requiring the owners to post financial security
with the state. * * * Each plan had 1nerit and
many were incorporated in the various State Financial Responsibility Laws. * * * There is and
continues to be considerable debate over the Inerits of the various plans to meet public responsibility for the pay1nent of the claims and judgments against the uninsured and irresponsible
motorists. Still, the gap was not closed in compensating the injured against the drivers whose
companies denied liability for lack of permission
to drive by the owner and for want of insured's
cooperation. In other words, there were still a
great number of unsatsfied judgment creditors
who were not cmnpensated for injuries received.
* * * Private companies showed little interest and
they did not begin to accept the 'public responsibility' until January, 1954. At that time the insurance industry becmne interested in devising a
plan to compensate injured parties. Pressure of
public opinion continued to increase, but the companies were not too quick to accept the challenge
because of possible political meddling, rate and
underwriting problems, operating expenses, etc.
They planned and wrote an uninsured coverage
provision in the policy within the frame work of
the present private insurance principle without
too great an increase in premium cost, within the
administration of justice and rules of tort lia-

bility. * * *"

he S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and L
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
The significance and importance of the arbitration
feature of this coverage was explained by Fieting in
Best's Insurance News, Fire and Casualty edition, October, 1961, at page 57:
'''Provision for arbitrating what were anticipated to likely be the most common kinds of disagreements between insurance companies and
their insureds under uninsured motorists coverage
has been part and parcel of this form of insurance ever since its inception in New York State
back in 1955. It recognizes the desirability of and
is designed to accomplish these things :

"1. Provide a speedy, just and economical
means for determining the amount of the insurer's
payment liability.
"2. Avoid the necessity for and disadvantages of litigation with the uninsured motorist
prior to settlement of claims under this coverage.
"3. Leave the legal status of the uninsured
motorist's liability to respond in damages unaffected by any action or proceedings taken in disposition of an insured's claim under this coverage.
"Basic to Coverage

aThe basic arbitration requirement is part of
the very grant of coverage, the insuring agreement specifying that 'determination as to whether
the insured ... is legally entitled to recover ...
damages, and if so, the amount thereof, shall be
made by agreement between the insured . . . and
the company or, if they fail to agree, by arbitration. Means for implementation of this arbitration requirement and objective are contained in
two additional policy (or endorsement) provi-
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sion~. One of thP~P ~1wcifies the A1nerican Arbitration A~~<wiation a~ the tribunal for any arbitration, and 1nakes the arbitrators' awards binding on the parties even to the extent of pennitting
entry of judgment on such awards. The other
makes full compliance with all tern1s of the uninsured motorists coverage a condition precedent
to any action against the con1pany.

'}(<*****
"The language employed can leave no doubt
but that as to liability (as distinguished frmn
coverage) and as to the amount of recoverable
dmnages, the policy or endorsmnent makes arbitration of an uninsured motorist's claim compulsory at the option of either the insured or the
insurance company. The policy language in this
respect, in effect, undertakes to abrogate the right
of either party to sue the other in courts of law
on such disputed questions.
"What about questions as to whether this
coverage applies at all to an asserted claim~ What
about a claim denied by the insurance company
on the ground that the automobile which struck
the insured was not in fact an 'uninsured automobilef Or, what if the insurance con1pany denies
that the injured person qualifies as an 'insured'
and consequently, is not a beneficiary of this
coverage~ Can arbitration of such coverage questions be required~ Can an 'insured' or alleged
insured compel the insurance company to proceed
with arbitration of disputed questions of liability
and damages while such coverage questions remain unresolved~
"There manifestly is no reference in any of
the policy or endorsement provisions to arbitration of such coverage question and disagreements.

he S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and L
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
It consequently was quite properly assumed and
continues to be the position of the insurance companies that coverage questions, as distinguished
from liability and damage issues, are not subject
to compulsory arbitration and, unless both parties
agree to arbitrate such differences, they must be
determined in appropriate court proceedings. The
New York case law, originally developed accordingly and early tended to establish these propositions:

"1. Only disagreements between insured and
insurance company relating to the legal liability
of the uninsured motorist and the amount of the
insured's damages must be arbitrated.
"2. Other disagreements - those relating to
application of the coverage - may be litigated
in courts of law or equity." (Emphasis ours.)
In light of these considerations, we proceed to an
examination of the law. There appears to be a misconception among the bench and bar generally of this State, that
any contract to submit to arbitration a dispute of any
issue which may arise in the future under contractual
agreement, is unenforceable. We do not believe that any
decision of this court has gone so far. A careful reading
of the earlier decisions of this court will reveal that they
are not out of harmony wth general principles regarding
arbitration in other states. We shall later examine the
Utah authorities in detail, but first we turn to some
general principles.
In 5 Am. J ur. 2d 535, Arbitration and Award, Sec. 30,
the following rule is set forth:
·"Where a contract contains a stipulation that
the decision of arbitrators on certain questions
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shall be a condition precede1z.t to the right of
action on the co}/tract itself, such stipulat-io11 zcill
be enforced, and until the method adopted has
been pursued, or some sufficient reason given for
not pursuing it, no action can be brought on thr.
contract. * * *" (Emphasis ours.)

In tlw sa1ne article at page 573, Sec. 72, the following
rule is set forth:
"Notwithstanding the general rule that an
unperformed abritration agreen1ent will not bar
a suit on the same subject matter, if a party's
right to bring suit is validly conditioned on a11
award of abritrators or appraisers respecting differences as to certain factual matters, the courts
will not take j~wisdiction of his suit until he has
complied with the condition precedent or is legally
excused therefrom. If the arbitration fails through
the fault of the suing party, it is a bar to his
action. * * *" (Emphasis ours.)
And at pages 57 4-5 of the same work, the following
language is found:
"As a general rule, if the terms of the contract expressly or by necessary implication require an award on a preliminary question absolutely and in any event before a suit may be
brought, it is incumbent on the suitor, under
penalty of not stating a cause of action, affirmatively to plead and prove his perforn1ance of the
condition, or, by appropriate specific allegations,
affirmatively to excuse his nonperformance. On
the other hand, if arbitration is not of the essence of the contract, but is to proceed, according
to the terms of the agreement, only on occurrence of a contingency, such as an actual disagreement on the arbitrable question, or the re-
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quest of one of the parties, the failure of the
arbitration is matter of defense to be pleaded and
proved in order to defeat a recovery. Although
there is authority to the contrary, where arbitration is a condition precedent, in order to bar
a suit, it is ordinarily sufficient to set up the
agreement and nonperformance thereof through
fault of the party bringing suit, since the agreement, if valid, is concerned only with ascertainment of preliminary facts, and not with liability,
and the award will be evidence of such facts but
will not itself support an action."
Seealso 29'A Am. Jur. 699, Insurance Sec.1611:
·"In accordance with general principles applicable to all contracts, it is the rule that a provision in an insurance policy that all disputes
arising under the policy shall be submitted to
arbitrators, or a provision similar in substanqe
and effect, is not binding. On the other hand, the
view prevailing in nearly all jurisdictions is that
a stipulation not ousting the jurisdiction of the
courts, but leaving the general question of liability
for a loss to be judicially determined, and simply providing a reasonable method of estimating
and ascertaining the amount of the loss, is valid."
(Emphasis ours.)
Many courts in construing insurance contracts have
held in accordance with the principles above set forth.
In Hamilton v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co.,
136 U.S. 242, 34 L.ed. 419, 10 S.Ct. 945, the Supreme
Court of the United States said:
"'The c?nditions of ~he policy ~n suit clearly
and unequivocally manifest the Intention and
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agreement of the parties to the contract of insurance that any difference arising between thmn as
to the a1nount of loss or damage of the property
insured shall be submitted at the request, in writing of either party, to the appraisal of cmnpetent
and impartial persons to be chosen as therein
provided, whose award shall be conclusive as to
the amount of such loss or damage only, and shall
not determine the question of liability of the
company; that the company shall have the right
to take the whole or any part of the property at
its appraised value so ascertained, and that until
such an appraisal shall have been permitted, and
such an award obtained, the loss shall not be
payable and no action shall lie against the company. ·The appraisal, when requested in writing
by either party, is distinctly made a condition
maintenance of any action. Such a stipulation, not
ousting the jurisdiction of the courts, but leaving
the general question of liability to be judicially determined and simply providing a reasonable method of esti1nating and ascertaining the an1ount of
the loss, is unquestionably valid, according to the
uniform current of authority in England and
this country.... The case con1es within the general
rule long ago laid down by this court : 'Where the
parties, in their contract, fix on a certain n1ode
by which the amount be paid shall be ascertained,
as in the present case, the party that seeks an
enforcement of the agreement must show that he
has done everything on his part which could
be done to carry it into effect. He cannot compel
the payment of the amount claimed unless he
shall procure the kind of evidence required by
the contract, or show· that by time or accident
he is unable to do so.... [T] he defendant explicitly and repeatedly, in writing, requested that
the amount of the loss or damage should be sub-
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n1itted to appraisers, in accordance with the terms
of the policy, and . . . the plaintiff has as often
peremptorily refused to do this. . . . The court,
therefore rightly instructed the jury that the
defendant had requested in writing, and the plaintiff had declined, the appraisal provided in the
policy, and that the plaintiff therefore could not
maintain this action."
In Headley v. Aetna Ins. Co., 202 Ala. 384, 80 So.
466, the Alabama Court said :
"A covenant in a contract, whether of insurance or of other matters, to submit every matter
of dispute between the parties, growing out of
such contract, to arbitration or to a board of
appraisers, to the end of defeating the jurisdiction of courts as to the subject-matter, are universally held to be void, as against public policy.
. . . Agreements, however, which merely provide
a mode or manner for ascertaining the value of
property or the amount of damages, losses, or
profits, are valid, and may be made conditions
precedent to the right of action to recover damages based on such values, dan1ages, losses or
profits. . . . The clause of the insurance policy
in question falls within the latter class, and is
valid and enforceable. The policy of this state
favors arbitration and amicable settlement of differences between parties; but it does not fa.vor
or allow agreements in advance to oust or defeat
the jurisdiction of all courts, as to all differences
between parties . ...
"Where the contract explicitly Inakes the determination by arbitration of an1ounts Yalues
qualities, etc., a condition precedent to tl1e n 1 ain~
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tunance of an action, it is binding, as in insurance
. contracts, . . .
"If parties to contracts of insurance con•nant
that in case of disagreement as to the an1ount of
the loss or damages, or the value of the property
destroyed or damaged, they will submit such differences to disinterested parties as appraisers,
arbitrators, or umpires, . . . and rnake an award
of such parties a prerequisite to the bringing of
a suit on such insurance policy, such covenant or
agreement is valid, and will be enforced by the
courts, ... " (Emphasis ours.)
In St. Paul F. & M. Insurance Co. v. Kirkpatrick,
129 Tenn. 55, 164 S.W. 1186, the Tennessee court said:
"When there is an arbitration clause in substance like the one we have described, it is the
duty of either party to comply and appoint an
arbitrator, when requested so to do by the other
party. If the insured fails to comply with this
demand, he cannot sue on the policy, and, if the
refusal be persisted in for an unreasonable time,
it will amount to a forfeiture of the policy."
In Fisher v. Merchants Insurance Co., 95 Me. 486,
60 A2d 82, the Court said :
"While it has long been settled in this country
and in England that a stipulation in a contract
providing for the settlement by arbitration of all
controversies and disputes that might subsequently arise between the parties is invalid, because
its effect would be to oust the courts of their
jurisdiction, it is equally well settled that if the
arbitration agreement relates only to the determination of some preliminary 1natter, such as the
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amount of damages to be recovered, and does not
apply to the whole question of liability, such provision when a reasonable and definite method
is pro~ided for choosing the arbitrators is valid
and enforceable."
That court also quoted from Stephenson v. Ins. Co.,·
54 Me. 55, as follows :
" 'While parties may impose, as a condition
precedent to application to the courts, that they
shall first have settled the amount to be recovered
by an agreed mode, they cannot entirely close the
access to the courts of law.' This doctrine has
become so universally recognized by the courts
that it is unnecessary to refer to further authorities in support.
* * * * * *
"And it is settled beyond controversy that,
when the contract provides that no action upon
it shall be maintained until after such an a\Yard,
then the award is a condition precedent to the
right of action."

Before turning to the decisions of this court, we
also invite attention to the '.vell considered opinion of the
Supreme Court of Minnesota in the case of Park Construction Co. v. Independent School District No. 32, 296
NW 4!75. ·The court there said:
"The historical and only basis for the opinion
that executory agreen1ents to arbitrate all issues
to arise under the contract are void, as against
public policy, is open to serious question. There
is eminent authority . . . that the rule was the
product of judicial jealousy rather than judicial
reasoning. . . . [I]t arose in the time when the
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emoluments of the judges depended Inainl)~, or
almost entirely, upon fees.' In those days they had
no fixed salary and so there was great competition to get as much as possible of litigation into
Westminster Hall, and a great scramble . . . for
the division of the spoil.' In consequence, they
had great jealousy of arbitrations ... they said
that the courts ought not to be ousted of their
jurisdiction, and that it was, contrary to the policy
of the law to do so.'
"To that doctrine, its questionable origin
aside, there are two destructive objections:
"First, there appears never to have been any
factual basis for holding that an agreement to
arbitrate 'ousted' jurisdiction. It has no effect
upon the jurisdiction of any court. Arbitration
simply removes a controversy from the arena of
litigation. It is no more an ouster of judicial
jurisdiction than is a compromise and settle1nent
or that peculiar offspring of legal ingenuity
known as the covenant not to sue. Each disposes
of issues without litigation which no more than
the other ousts the courts of jurisdiction. . . .
" ''The decision by arbitration is the decision
of a tribunal of the parties' own choice and erec. tion... The tribunal is one that they have a legal
right to erect. That being so, what self justification can judges assert for nullifying such rightful
choice. In the field of industry, a chorus of deserved derision would silence declaration that a
collective bargaining agreement for arbitration of
future issues was violative of public policy.
"Second, if there ever was public policy
against agreements to arbitrate, it has disap~
peared. Now the policy of this state, as declared
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by the legislature, . . . and applied by this court
. favors arbitration.
* * * * * *

"Here . . . our conclusion opposes that of
many earlier decisions of this court insofar as
they have ruled that a general agreement to arbitrate all differences to arise under a contract is
contrary to public policy and therefore void, they
are overruled.... They are disapproved notwithstanding their accord with a prevailing view of
decision law elsewhere.
''For this departure from a doctrine of long
standing, we make no apology. To us the reasons
assigned are so compelling as to allow no other
course.
* * * * * *

''So long as an award of arbitrators is enforceable by action, it is automatically subject to
enough of court review."
In order to give force and effect to the arbitration
provisions of the policy here involved, it is not necessary
for this court to go as far as the ~Ennesota court has
gone. Indeed, as we shall den1onstrate, it is not necessary
for this court to depart fron1 its previous holdings.
However, some words of elucidation by this court would
no doubt be helpful to the trial bench and bar.
There appear to be three earlier decisions from the
Court bearing on this question. The first of these was
Fox Film Corporation v. Ogden Theatre Co. 82 Ut. 279,
17 P.2d 294. This court there said:
"Arbitration provisions in contracts are verv
generally held to be severable from the body df
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the contract. Arbitration provision~ of the kind
in question, that is, those types that are in no
wise connected with the promises each })(t rty
makes to the other, but which on the contrary
look to the future and provide a method of arbitrating disputes that may arise, are by practically
all courts held to be severable provisions. * * *
An agreement in a contract to arbitrate disputes
that may arise is not a part of the substance of
the contract. It pertains to remedy only, and is
collateral to the contractual matters. The contract was not made for the purpose of bringing
about the arbitration. * * *
"We are of the opinion that the arbitration
provisions in the contract at bar deal wholly with
a method of procedure and are therefore severable
from the body of the contract that fixes the obligations of the parties." (Emphasis ours.)
The inference naturally to be drawn frmn the quoted
language is that where the arbitration agree1nent is inextricably interwoven with the substance of the contractual agree1nent, and is part of the consideration therefor,
as is the situation here, it will be enforceable. One of
the basic considerations which influenced the insurance
industry to make this coverage available to the 1notoring
public at a nominal rate was that claims thereunder could
be handled at minimal expense through arbitration proceedings, rather than by the comparatively expensive
process of litigation.
The second Utah case is Johnson v. Brinkerhoff,
89 Ut. 580, 57 P.2d 1132. In that case this court quoted
with approval from Blodgett Co. v. Bebe Co., 190 Cal.
664, 214 P. 38, 41, 26 A.L.R. 1070, as follows:
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"The provision for arbitration in the case
at bar being one covering all disputes thereafter
to ari~e under the contract, and not being confined to the ascertainment of a fact essential to
the existence of the cause of a.ction itself, comes
clearly within the general rule that it is not binding upon either party to it." (Emphasis ours.)
The type of contract there discussed was entirely different from the one in the case at bar. Again we invite
attention to the fact that the arbitration provision in
he Uninsured l\1otorist coverage does not purport to
require arbitration of all disputes arising under the insurance contract. On the contrary, by its express terms,
it is limited to certain types of disputes arising under
Uninsured Motorist coverage only. There is, for example, no provision for arbitration of disputes arising
under the liability coverage provisions of the policy, nor
under the physical dan1age provisions of the policy; nor
the medical payments coverage of the policy form.
Neither do its provisions purport to require arbitration of all disputes under the Uninsured l\1otorist coverage itself. For exmnple, the parties are not required
to arbitrate the question of timeliness of the notice of
the claim. See 7 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, Sec. 4331, supplement page 12:
"·The question of timeliness of notice of claim
is not within the purview of arbitration clause."
See also Application of M.-v.A.I.C., 226 NYS2d 285.
Likewise a dispute as to whether the clain1ant is
an insured within the meaning of the lJninsured l\Iotorist
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coverag<' i~ not subjed to arbitration. See 7 Applenmn,
InsnraneP Law nlHl Practice, See. -±~331, supplen1ent page
12:
"A dispute relating to status of a clai1nant
as an insured within coverage of policy was not
within arbitration provision of uninsured motorist endorsement."
Se also McGuinness v. M.Y.A.I.C., 225 NYS2d 36,
Syllabus 3:
"A dispute relating to status of a clailnant
under an automobile policy as an insured was
not a dispute within the arbitration provision of
the uninsured motorist coverage of policy."
Again the question of whether the vehicle involved
was in fact uninsured is not an issue subject to arbitration under the Uninsured Motorist coverage. See 7
Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, Sec. 4331, page
215:
"It has presently been held that the parties
are not bound to arbitrate the question of whether
or not the vehicle in question was in fact uninsured - as to that issue, declaratory judgment
would be a proper remedy."
To the same effect see Mithewitz v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 198 N.Y.S.2d 101, and Application of Allstate Ins.
Co., 207 N.Y.S.2d 645. See also Merchants Mutual Casualty Co. v. Wildman, 197 N.Y.S.2d 925.

In fact, of all of the issues which might arise under
the contract of insurance, only two are made the subject
of arbitration. These are the questions of (a) whether
there is liability on the part of the uninsured motorist
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to the claimant; and (h) the amount of damages the
plaintiff is entitled to recover. See 1\Iurtaugh v. American State Ins. Co., ( 0. App.), 187 NE2d 518:
"Only the two special issues [liability and
damages] agreed to be arbitrated can be arbitrated. All other questions of law and fact were
not submitted."
Quite obviously the arbitration provision of this insurance contract does not purport to make all future
disputes between the parties the subject of arbitration,
but merely to make two particular questions under one
particular coverage, the subject of arbitration. This is
not the type of arbitration provision which this court
refused to enforce in Johnson vs. Brinkerhoff.
Apparently the most recent expression of this court
this field, is that contained in the case of Latter v.
Holsum Bread Co., 108 Ut. 364, 160 P.2d 421. In that
case this court refused to enforce an arbitration agreement which required arbitration of all future disputes
with the following language:
1n

"It is almost the universal rule that in the
absence of a statute to the contrary, an agreement
to arbitrate all future disputes thereafter arising
under the contract does not constitute a bar to
an action on the contract involving such dispute,
on the ground that it seeks to deny to the parties
judicial remedies and therefore is contrary to
public policy. * * *" (En1phasis ours.)
In a forward-looking concurring opinion, Justice
Wolfe made the following comments :
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''In Johnson v. Brinkerhoff, 89 Utah 530,
57 P.~d 1132, we affirmed the connnon law rule
rdativP to commercial arbitration agree1nents.
HowPvPr, there is no reason to interject that smne
rule into other fields of law unless con1pelled to
do so by legislation. We shottld not hesitate to
make o1.uselves free from this rule ttchenever legislation indica,tes a change in public policy. In
the absence of legislation to the contrary, courts
should not hold that arbitration of disputes arising out of labor contracts are un-enforceable as
against public policy.

* * * * * *
"Court hostility to arbitration may in the
past have had a restrictive influence on our arbitration statute. It is time that courts generally
evidence a change in attitude to encourage rather
than discourage Hse of arbitration machinery in
cases where such machinery is well adapted. * * *"
(Emphasis ours.)
We invite also attention to certain provisions of
the Insurance Code. Sec. 31-19-9, U.C.A. 1953, provides
in part as follows:
"No insurance policy form) other than a
surety bond form or application form where written application is required, or rider form, pertaining thereto shall be isstted) delivered) or used
unless it has been filed with and approved by the
commissioner." (Emphasis ours.)

Sec. 31-19-10, lT.C.A. 1953, provides, insofar as material here, as follows:
"The commissioner shall disapprove any such
form of insurance policy, application, rider, or
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endorsement, or withdraw any previous approval
thereof, only
"(1) if it is in any respect in violation of or
does not comply with this code; * * *" (Emphasis
ours.)'
Sec. 31-19-11, U.C.A. 1953, provides, insofar as material here, as follows:
"('1) The written instrument, in which a contract of insurance is set forth, is the policy.

"(2) A policy shall specify:
"(g) the conditions pertaining to the insurance." (Emphasis ours.)
It is apparent that the form here involved is one
which has had the approval of the Insurance Commissioner. The fact that the Commissioner has not disapproved it, gives it, at least prima facie, the stamp of
validity under Sec. 31-19-10, U.C.A. 1953. The form
sets forth the conditions pertaining to the insurance as
required by Sec. 31-19-11, U.C.A. 1953. The form therefore has the sanction of statute and cannot be said to
be out of harmony with the public policy of this state.
In summary, we suggest that:
1. 'The arbitration provisions of the insurance policy
under consideration are liinited in scope, and do not
purport to require arbitration of all disputed issues, but
only of two issues which might arise under one coverage
only, of an insurance contract form which affords many
different coverages.
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2. The fonn has the aproval of the Insurance CmnInissioner, in accordanee with Legislative require1nent,
and is therefore not contrary to public policy.
3. The 1110dern trend of decision is to recognize
and enforce arbitration agremnents which do not offend
against general public policy.

-t. Enforcement of this arbitration agreement would
not represent a departure from the public policy of this
state, nor a departure frmn the rules of decision previously laid down by this court, but on the contrary would
be in hannony with the rules of decision of this court.
5. The arbitration agreement is limited in scope;
is in hannony with public policy; is harmonious with
the applicable statutes of this state; is harmonious with
the previous decisions of this court, and therefore, valid
and enforceable.
Plaintiff adinittedly failed to cmnply with a condition precedent provided by the contract of insurance on
which she based her claim, and having so failed, she
has no standing to maintain this action, and the judgment in her favor should be reversed and set aside.
POINT I
THE JUDGMENT IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE
AND AGAINST LAW.
POINT III
PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW.
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Section 41-6-63.10 U.C.A. 1953 provides as follows:
'''Whenever a highway has been divided into
two separate roadways by a dividing section, it
shall be unlawful to drive any vehicle upon any
such highway except to the right of such dividing
section, or to drive any vehicle over, upon, or 1
across any such dividing section or to make any
left turn or semi-circular or U-turn on any such
divided highway, except through a plainly marked
opening in such dividing section designed and designated for such left turn, semicircular or U -turn,
unless a sign or signs authorized and displayed
by the state road commission or other governmental agency shall otherwise indicate.
''A dividing section shall divide a highway
into two separate roadways, and shall consist of:

* * * * * *
"(3) A dividing area of over two feet in
width defined by either
" (a) A standard double line marking on each
side of the dividing section, each double line rnarking consisting of two four-inch wide lines four
inches apart,* * *"
The undisputed evidence in this case establishes that
at the place where the accident occurred, the highway
was divided into two separate roadways by a dividing
section as defined in the statute. Although there was an
opening or break in the divider in the vicinity where
the accident occurred, the evidence establishes without
any dispute that the plaintiff had passed beyond the
opening where a left hand turn could lawfully have been
made, and had proceeded to a point 82 feet south of the
opening, where she had stopped intending to execute a
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l(·ft hand turn whPn there \vas an opening in oncmning
traffi<". In short, plaintiff by her own ad1nission was in
the act of violating the statute above cited. In so doing
she was clearly guilty of contributory negligence as a
matter of law, and for that reason the judgment in her
favor should be reversed.

It is well settled in this state that the violation of
a statute or ordinance which fixes a standard of care
and is designed for the protection of the public or a portion thereof is negligence as a matter of law. See Smith
v. Mine & Smelter Supply Co., 32 Utah 21, 88 P. 683;
Skerl v. Willow Creek Coal Co., 92 Utah 47 4, 69 P.2d 502.
That rule has been held fully applicable to violations of
statutes for the control of motor vehicle traffic in the
case of North v. Cartwright, 119 Utah 516, 229 P.2d 871,
where this court said:
"The stattttes were promulgated for the protection of the pnblic and to safeguard property,
life and limb of persons 'Lts£ng the highways fro1n
accidents of the type here invol~·cd. Violation of
these statutes then, constitutes negligence in law.
This doctrine of law has been steadfastly adhered
to by this court and generally in other courts
throughout the United States. * * *

"Plaintiff's violation of the statutory standard of care here involved, bars recovery if the
violation was a proximate contributing cause of
the injury." (Emphasis ours.)
It is no answer to say that questions of negligence
and contributory negligence are generally for jury determination. While this is manifestly true where there
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is a conflict in the evidence, no conflict exists here. What
occurred is established by the undisputed testimony of
the plaintiff herself, by which she is hound. There is
neither a conflict in evidence to he resolved, nor are there
different inferences to be drawn from the undisputed
evidence. Neither is this an area where the trier of
fact may say what a reasonable person would have done·
under the circumstances. The legislature has specifically
prescribed what all persons shall do under the circumstances here prevailing. Plaintiff clearly did not conform to the legislative standard. Her failure to do so•
under the law of this state is negligence as a matter of
law barring her recovery in this case.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff admittedly failed to comply with a condition precedent stipulated in her contract of insurance
for the bringing of an action against her insurer, the
defendant in this case. Said stipulation was in harmony
with the public policy of this state, and was valid and
enforceable, and by reason thereof, plaintiff is debarred
from maintaining this action. The evidence further
shows that she was guilty of contributory negligence as
a matter of law. The judgment should be reversed with
directions to enter judgn1ent in favor of the defendant
and against the plaintiff, no cause of action.
Respectfully submitted,
CHRISTENSEN AND JENSEN
BY RAY R. CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant
1205 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake ·City, Utah
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